In September 2025, defense consultations were being advanced rapidly. Unmanned surface warship Magura V5 has been successfully achieved in actual combat in the Black Sea.
The Philippines is in contact with Ukraine to introduce this combat power into its own naval system.
Magura V5
Unmanned ships quietly entered the market, and Fiumu's dark lines started defense transactions
The spark of negotiations ignited in an instant in September 2025. The Philippines-Ukraine relations slide from diplomatic etiquette to military cooperation.
Ukrainian Ambassador Yuliia Fediv announced in Manila: A draft submitted by the Ministry of Defense to the Philippines' Ministry of Defense last year is under consideration. Draft core: Unmanned maritime combat platform technology sharing and cooperative production.
The draft covers the Magura V5 unmanned surface ship. Documents from both sides show that the agreement may include the following contents: technology transfer, that is, Ukraine allows the Philippines to obtain some unmanned boat design, software, navigation and combat components; joint production or assembly, Philippine shipyards participate in hull processing and internal component assembly; personnel training, Ukraine provides training courses to the Philippines, covering control, tactical deployment, maintenance and operations in electronic warfare environments.
The budget issue in the negotiations became one of the points of debate: Procurement price, post-maintenance cost and communication link security costs have been mentioned many times.
Col. Andrii Bilenkyi serves as the deputy military officer of the Ukrainian defence in the Philippines. He met with Philippine Defense Minister Gilberto Teodoro Jr. in September. The talks cannot be stopped at the "dream blueprint", but must be based on combat capabilities and legal provisions. Legal terms include division of liability, compensation for losses, and export control. Combat capabilities include the ability of unmanned boats to operate in strong electronic confrontation environments, navigation safety, and responsibility for operational out of control.
Many domestic military units in the Philippines participated in the draft discussion. Navy, logistics and intelligence units were summoned to the conference room. Some fleet commanders asked to see actual combat videos, evidence of damage, and reliable communication links for the Magura V5. Comparison of cost requirements by financial departments: Unmanned boat unit price, production line construction budget, import tariffs, and foreign exchange risks.
The discussion mentions the automatic navigation capability in the case of electronic interference and communication link interruption. Technical personnel require that Magura V5 continue to perform preset tasks or return to the base if the GPS or satellite signal is blocked or interfered with. The draft stipulates operational safety, including preventing diplomatic disputes caused by mistaken entry into international waters.
The Philippine Defense Network has experience in operating small unmanned boats and surface boats. The United States recently donated several USVs (Unmanned Surface Vessels) to the Philippines for surveillance and sea patrols. These experiences are cited by negotiators as the basis for local assembly and logistical support. The shipbuilding industry and the dinghy industry exist in many areas of the Philippines, and the experience of small boat production adds points to the negotiations.
The Black Sea frequently attacked, Magula teared open the defense line of the Russian ship
Magura V5 unmanned surface ship was released in mid-2023. The designers controlled the length of the hull to about 5.5 meters and the width of about 1.5 meters, the full load weight was slightly less than one ton. The blasting device can carry about 300 to 320 kilograms of explosives.
Speed speeds switch between high-speed cruise and sprint modes, up to about 42 knots. The battery life is about 60 hours. The voyage is nominally up to about 800 kilometers. The navigation system contains GNSS and inertial navigation. Video links and encrypted communication systems are used for monitoring and operation. In electronic interference environments, the task is relied on preset routes and automatic navigation loops to continue.
Frequent results in 2024. On February 1, the attack on the Tarantul‑III missile frigate Ivanovets using the ship to which the Magura V5 belonged was reported. The ship was hit by a group of unmanned boats near the Black Sea and then sank.
On February 14, a large landing ship, Tsezar Kunikov, sank after being raided by an unmanned boat in the waters of Alupka.
On March 5, patrol ship Sergei Kotov was hit by a Magura V5 in the Crimean waters and allegedly sunk.
The technical aspect shows multiple contradictions and conflicts. The number of unmanned boats operate in dark or low visibility environments increases. Night video was exposed, and multiple unmanned boats approached the target ship along the preset route, The hull fired during explosion and impact, cracked on the side of the side, and fractured at the tail. Video is low-definition and difficult to identify target numbers. Intelligence instructions operators use thermal imaging and video recognition to perform attacks in combination with inertial navigation.
The first time it appeared at the end of 2024 was publicly called an air target strike case. The modified Magura V5 was equipped with a modified thermal chase missile (such as the R‑73) and was reported to have shot down a Mi‑8 helicopter and the other was damaged.
Group13 Special unmanned system troops appear frequently. The unit is considered to be responsible for most Magura V5 attack missions in multiple public intelligence reports. Regularly publish summary of action results. In mid-2024, the unit claimed to have caused several damage to small Russian ships. The Buyan‑M-class missile boat was hit or damaged in the data. Unmanned boat manufacturers and operators continue to improve electronic confrontation, communication encryption, and navigation redundancy.
There is controversial in the public data on the record. The Russian Ministry of Defense has denied or incompletely confirmed some reports. In some reports of "sinking" Russia admitted to being attacked but said the damage could be repaired. The Russian side is vague about the sinking state of Ivanovets and Kunikov. Some sources in the Sergei Kotov report said sunk and some said severe damage. The casualties are different.
In the Sergei Kotov incident, some publicly reported seven crew members dead, several injured and the rest were rescued.
The Philippines locks in the "low-cost killer" in the South China Sea, trying to reshape the order of the war zone
The concentration of interest in the Magura V5 within the Philippine defense system broke out in mid-2025. After several rounds of internal meetings, the Philippine Navy proposed several specific deployment ideas. The preliminary plan consists of three parts: Deployment area settings, platform integration methods, and long-term operation and maintenance solutions.
In terms of deployment areas, priority will be given to the direction of the West Philippine Sea, including the western coast of Palawan Island, the waters around Lile Beach, and the southwest waters of Luzon Island. All regions are in the exclusive economic zones claimed by the Philippines. Tactical design aims at node control, uses islands and reefs to set up shore-based command facilities and communication beacons as relay points, and supports unmanned tactical marshalling operations of dozens of boats.
The platform integration method is not fixed, but it tends to purchase finished products in parallel with local assembly. The Philippines has several small and medium-sized shipyards, some of which have experience in building high-speed boats. If Ukraine provides a complete list of components and technical interfaces, Manila will arrange for local industries to take over the integration of hull manufacturing and power system. The warheads, control systems and sensor units will continue to rely on Ukrainian supply.
In terms of personnel training, the Philippines proposes two levels of plans: Basic operation training is provided by Ukraine, including remote control operation, task planning, fleet management, video reconnaissance and identification, and tactical evasion actions; advanced technical training is planned to introduce a third-country or multilateral assistance mechanism, and countries with mature unmanned system operation experience will assist in training the instructor team. The entire system aims to complete the localized and autonomous operation of the initial tactical unit within three years.
The concept of "maritime grid tactics" appears in the project management document. The specific strategy is: centered on Magura V5, cooperate with small motherships and floating supply units, deploy high-frequency dispatched unmanned boat formations, and maintain continuous existence in tactical sensitive areas. Daily tasks are mainly cruise, surveillance, virtual blockade, and electronic disturbance; in emergency situations, swarm charge, self-destruction strike, and shore ship reconnaissance can be carried out.
To support such ideas, the Philippines plans to build several shore-based data processing and communication hubs, concentrated in Palawan, Sanbalis, Krabi and other places. Each node will undertake remote control, image return processing, route command generation and other functions to establish a complete human-machine collaboration chain.
The Philippines particularly emphasized cost factors during the negotiations. Each Magura V5 costs around $250,000, with short maintenance cycles and flexible use. The Philippines Department of Defense expects to complete a full unmanned boat tactical strike at a cost of 5% less than a missile speedboat. According to the plan, each node is equipped with 12 to 16 unmanned boats, and more than 6 can be formed each time it is dispatched to form a cross-interleaving and multi-party coordinated surface attack formation.
Information security is listed as one of the core issues of negotiation. The Philippines is worried that communication links will be interfered with, mission paths will be exposed, and even unmanned boats will be intercepted by technology and cracked in reverse. Ukraine provides redundant measures for encrypted communication and navigation, including offline automatic cruiseHybrid system for inertial navigation + attitude correction. The project technical documents also stipulate that all remote operating links must be transited locally through the Philippines to ensure that control is not leaked.
Another undisclosed link is the combat load replacement problem of unmanned boats. The Magura V5 was originally set as a suicide attack boat, but also supports modular load replacement. The Philippines hopes to expand the use of the platform and develop it into a multi-purpose version such as recyclable surveillance boats, anti-mine platforms, and tactical deception carriers. This idea still needs subsequent negotiations and confirmation in terms of technical feasibility, software adaptation, security protocols, etc.
The Philippine Defense Minister once said on informal occasions that the cooperation plan is essentially an attempt to deal with the disadvantages of traditional military structures with asymmetric capabilities. Low cost, high frequency, distributed, and fast recovery are the core of strategic design.
The results of the battle are intertwined, and who can advance to actual combat beyond the tactical illusion
Magura V5's battlefield performance is concentrated between the second half of 2023 and the end of 2024, with the main targets being targeted at Russian ships in the Black Sea. The actual combat record can be traced back to the fall of 2023, when a Russian patrol boat lost its combat capability after being attacked outside the port of Sevastopol. Although the Russian side did not disclose in detail, Ukraine released videos and radar trajectories to support it.
In February 2024, the USS Ivanovez missile boat was besieged by several Magura V5s in the Black Sea. The unmanned boat adopts cross-propulsion and detonation delay methods. After three consecutive rounds of impact, the ship suffered a severe side explosion and sank rapidly. The Russian Navy only briefly admitted that the ship had "severe damage to war" and did not clearly sink.
Only two weeks later, the large landing ship "Kunikov" was hit in a concentrated manner less than 10 nautical miles from the Crimean coast. The Magura formation attacked at night, cutting into the defense blind spot from multiple directions. The ship sank to the bottom of the sea three hours after the fire broke out. The incident was listed by the International Maritime Organization as one of the major surface combat events of 2024. Uzbek declares that it uses 6 Magura V5s, none of which survives.
The attack in March turned its target to the patrol ship "Sergei Kotov". The combat environment is complex and the ship is in a sailing state. Unmanned boats gather through pre-embedded points and use multiple waves and short intervals to disrupt target defense. The ship was hit twice on the port side, and a break appeared on the starboard side, and the ship finally overturned. This action marks the first successful destruction of a non-static target by the Magura system. Russia did not respond positively to the damage to the war.
In actual deployment, Magura V5 also suffered multiple failures. Some ships are equipped with near defense systems and high-speed shooting devices, and effectively intercept them after discovering unmanned boats. In at least three missions, the unmanned boat was destroyed within 200 meters of the target and failed to detonate. There are also several missions where the unmanned boat deviates from the route due to communication interruption or navigation errors, and eventually drifts or detonates on its own.
As of now, the Magura series has caused more than 10 Russian ships to be damaged in the Ukrainian report. Although some data still needs cross-verification, its tactical logic of "for impact" has been established on the Black Sea battlefield. Whether this experience can be completely copied to Southeast Asian waters with complex, high-intensity electronic warfare environments remains to be tested.
