Once upon a time, hot pot was the well-deserved "king" in the Chinese catering industry - the catering market size in 2024 was 5.57 trillion yuan, and hot pot accounted for 617.5 billion yuan, Equivalent to every 10 yuan spent by Chinese people to eat, 1.1 yuan was spent into the hot pot.
The industry's growth rate in the first two years was even more terrifyingly strong, nearly 20% the year before yesterday, and 6.8% the year last year. Observers are optimistic that hot pot can account for 14% or even 18% of the catering market in the future.
But who would have thought that under the halo of "king", there was already a bloody storm. Today's hot pot industry is experiencing an unprecedented "battle royale".
Top brands are under collective pressure, closing more than 300,000 stores a year
The "chilling" in the hot pot industry, from top brands to small and medium-sized stores, almost none of them survived, and the data intuitively demonstrated this crisis:
The performance of the leading brands declined: Haidilao's average customer price fell from 103 yuan to 97.5 yuan, and its revenue, profit and turnover rate fell simultaneously, with the stock price only one-fifth of its high point; the unit price of Banu customer fell from 150 yuan to 138 yuan; the cowardly hotpot threw out the ultra-low price of "8.8 yuan at the bottom of the pot, 9.9 yuan at the meat dishes, and 6.6 yuan at the vegetarian dishes", but it still failed to save the performance.
The trend of closing stores swept the industry: 73 stores were closed in a year, and shrimps were even worse. 138 stores were closed, and the stock price fell to 80 cents and became a "life stock"; Nan Hotpot closed 57 stores in the first five months, with the lowest daily turnover of a single store being only 1,800 yuan.
Over 60% of the industry's blood exchange: From November 2023 to November 2024, more than 300,000 hot pot stores nationwide were closed. You should know that the total number of hot pot stores nationwide has remained stable at more than 500,000 for a long time, which means that in a year, three-fifths of the industry have been replaced!
per capita consumption continues to decline: From more than 86 yuan in 2022 to 77 yuan in 2024, no one can escape this "battle royale".
The source of the crisis: the tide of the main meal is low, and hot pot is the first to be affected
The root of this "fight" is not the decline in the competitiveness of the hot pot industry itself, but the overall ebb of the "meal meal market" behind it.
In the caliber of the Bureau of Statistics, the main meal is a full-service restaurant that provides Chinese and Western style stir-frying dishes and staple foods, and waiters deliver food to the table. China is the world's second only to India's "main meal powerhouse". main meals account for more than 70% of the catering market, much higher than that of major food powerhouses such as Italy and France.
Hotpot, with its "full service + strong social attributes", can be called "the main meal of the main meal". Previously, the differentiated competition in the hot pot industry also focused on the attributes of regular meals: either rolling upstream supply chain or rolling downstream services - Haidilao relies on shoe polishing, manicure, and 24-hour business to become popular all over the country. Hot pot relies on hip-hop and shop assistant dancing to create an atmosphere, which is essentially to turn "service to the extreme".
Self-rescue and transformation: From multi-brand layout to seizing the small hot pot track
In the face of the crisis, the leading brands are also actively saving themselves, but the results are not satisfactory.
Haidilao had a long prediction and chose to "walking on two legs":
Focus on takeaway: Make takeaway revenue soar by 60%, but unfortunately, takeaway only accounts for 4.5% of the total revenue, which has limited pull on overall performance;
Multi-brand layout: Launch the "Red Pomegranate Plan", incubating 11 new brands in one go, and tried them all from Malatang to Chinese fast food. Unfortunately, none of them can handle the main points so far. In the first half of 2024, 33 stores were closed, and the overall store size has shrunk.
It is difficult to make hot pot in main meals, and merchants have begun to collectively transform to "fast food" and the small hot pot track has thus become a new battlefield.
The small hot pot market seems to be hot in 2024: the scale growth rate is as high as 28.9%, with more than 50,000 stores, accounting for 10% of the total number of hot pot stores in the country. But there is a trick behind the "hot":
There are few new enterprises: There are only more than 4,000 newly established small hot pot enterprises, the second smallest in the past eight years, and 60% less than in 2019;
Single source of players: it is not that the boss discovers new opportunities, but that the giants who cannot find incremental amounts in the main hot pot come to the hot pot to "roll for life and death".
The giants are well aware that the core of hot pot is "cheap", so "the pot base starts at 5 yuan", "eat vegetables for 9.9 yuan", and "free rice for small ingredients" have become standard configurations - the average customer price is controlled at 50 yuan to be considered qualified, and it is considered competitive if it can be reduced to 30 or 40 yuan.
Under this trend, the original dominant shrimp replenishment suffered: it gained fans with a package of more than 20 yuan in the early years, but since 2014, the price has increased for ten consecutive years, and the average customer price has increased from 44 yuan to 62 yuan; when it wanted to reduce the price in 2024, it would be useless even if the average customer price dropped to 54 yuan, and consumers were attracted by the new brand of 30 to 40 yuan.
In the end, Xiajijiaji lost 1.2 billion in four years, and its market value fell from HK$29.4 billion to 900 million, a drop of 97%.
High-end hot pot "fake concept" breaks the deadlock: the market is small, and it is difficult to survive even if it is reduced in price
Not only are the mid- and low-end hot pots under pressure, but high-end hot pots have not escaped. The so-called "high-end track" has been proven to be a "pseudo-concept".
Coupou: Once the hot pot + tea break was so popular that it was queuing for three hours, the average customer price was 150 yuan, and now the revenue plummeted 26.5%, and 20% of the stores contributed 87% of the group's losses;
Banu: He shouted "The service is not excessive, everything is particular." The average customer price is nearly 50 yuan higher than Haidilao. However, data in 2024 show that Haidilao's single store revenue is twice that of Banu, and the single store net profit is 2.5 times that of Banu. Banu can only reduce the average customer price again and again.
Essentially, the market space for high-end hot pot is narrow: the high-end hot pot market with a unit price of more than 120 yuan accounts for only 1.16% of the industry, and the maximum amount is only 7 billion. In the limited market, it is difficult to support multiple high-end brands. The closing of stores and the reduction of prices in Banu are proof that the "pseudo-concept" of high-end hot pot has completely broken the deadlock.
"Battle Royale" is not the end, but the beginning of the return of hot pot to its essence
In fact, looking further, the hot pot industry is already lucky - other catering categories began to be eliminated intra-roll two years ago, and hot pot was not truly "sand-sand" until last year, and enjoyed a good life for another year.
For ordinary consumers, the brand's "discomfort" is precisely our "good days": in the future, there may be no need to queue for one or two hours in a hot pot restaurant, and there may be no need to spend seven or eight hundred yuan on a hot pot meal.
After all, from the beginning, hot pot was the delicacy of ordinary working people. It was friendly to the people, had the energy of fireworks, and was cheap and generous, which was what it should be. This "battle royale" is not the end, but the beginning of letting hot pot return to its essence.
