Hiki Tojo and the Japanese people, the "little nest of eggs".
Subject preface:
Emperor Hirohito is very clear that ancient and modern politics, angry youth and populist sentiment are always natural allies of centralization and dictatorship.
Now, looking at the Japanese war of aggression against China and the Pacific War, there are actually many intriguing questions.
However, being willing to think is always a technical problem in society.
However, this is a misunderstanding.
In fact, in terms of Japan's national conditions and the international situation at that time, Japan has pushed itself into the abyss of defeat since launching the Lugou Bridge Incident and then launching the full-scale invasion of China in the Battle of Shanghai, in terms of military strategy theory, it has pushed itself into the abyss of defeat.
Although Japan, after several stages of Sino-Japanese War, Russo-Japanese War and World War I, began to become a world power and was known as a military power, Japan began to develop modernly and modernly, and achieved achievements and wealth.
In the summer and autumn of 1937, Japan developed rapidly in economic, industrial, military and other aspects. However, in terms of Japan's industrial foundation, it was a huge gap compared to the old imperialist powers, but it was barely weaker than second-rate countries in Europe and the United States.
At the same time, Japan lacks overseas colonial resources, and its local resources are also extremely scarce, and its overall national strength cannot support the long-term war.
So, more variables will inevitably appear in the process of war.
No doubt, if Japan cannot quickly fight to defeat China, it will inevitably fall into the quagmire of war.
It can be seen that the online rumor that Japan took all its bets and could win the war with the whole country's efforts, but in fact it was a empty talk by scholars who were free from the Japanese war resources.
War resources decisively affect the process of the war. This is the case in the current Russian-Ukrainian War, and the Sino-Japanese War back then. This is a very easy-to-see question.
We can see that in fact, the top decision makers in Japan must have seen it more clearly.
Especially "on-site negotiation", it is a killer move by Japanese diplomacy accompanying force invasion.
In the eyes of the Japanese, "on-site negotiation" is an insurance for the occurrence of armed friction between China and Japan without the comprehensiveization of war.
However, Japan did not estimate that in the end, the total Sino-Japanese War would also be far-reachingly influenced by the international community outside the Sino-Japanese War in terms of economy, politics, diplomacy, culture, finance, etc.
The gap in national strength and military strength between China and Japan was actually completely exposed on the battlefield in the first year of the outbreak of the War of Resistance Against Japan.
In the summer and autumn of 1937, a total war between China and Japan broke out.
After the Battle of Wuhan, the Japanese army invaded central China and occupied Wuhan after paying a huge cost of military and material consumption.
Using precious casualties and material consumption in exchange for land was the Russian army's strategy on the battlefield of Donbas, and Japan was the same in the past, which were both taboos of modern military strategists.
In 1939, the Sino-Japanese War entered a stalemate stage, which was the beginning of Japan's defeat.
This year, the Japanese army was already exhausted from the battlefield of China. If they wanted to implement the strategy of going north and going south, they were powerless.
At this time, the Japanese military and political elites were eager to make peace with the Wang Puppet Group, and were also very anxious about the strategic issue of quick battle and decisive victory.
So, the populist sentiment in Japan led the Japanese government and the Japanese army in their relations with China, and they were blindly entering the path of fighting and showing off their strength and advancing but not retreating.
A Japanese command center outside Wanping City during the July 7 Incident.
In May 1938, General Suichi Terauchi, Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese invaders, and Lieutenant General Hatasujiro, Commander-in-Central Front Army, were at Xuzhou Airport.
In fact, looking back at history, China and Japan had at least three opportunities for peace talks during the July 7 Incident, the Battle of Shanghai and the eve of the Battle of Wuhan.
End, the Japanese people were in a hurry, and the top Japanese military and political leaders greedily waited and watched several times, which made all the three extremely precious peace talks that concern the destiny of China and Japan died.
Rejected peace talks, and war naturally came on.
A few years after the Battle of Wuhan, the Chinese battlefield was like a quagmire. The Japanese army's front line was extended and deeply trapped in it. The economy was overwhelmed and on the verge of collapse. The payable foreign exchange that can be used to purchase strategic materials such as oil and food to ensure the war was almost exhausted...
At this moment, Japan is also at the critical moment of life and death that grits its teeth and endures.
(On September 5, the Russian President expressed Russian economic warning at the Oriental Economic Forum on Vladivostok that the Russian Central Bank "works" to cut interest rates, etc., which also shows that the long-term war of Russia and Ukraine has a significant impact on the party launching the war)
In 1941, Japan faced the threat of US oil embargo and economic sanctions, and continued the war faced an unprecedented crisis.
There is no complete war plan and insufficient war resources, but we must resolutely choose war.
Now, the Sino-Japanese War is out of control, and Japan is forced by the situation to consider adjusting and responding to the war of aggression against China and international relations.
Strategic materials are exhausted and the war will definitely not be able to continue.
From the full invasion of China in 1937 - the sneak attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941, Japan launched the Lugou Bridge Incident from Menglang, and hastily increased its troops to the Battle of Shanghai, brazenly crossed the command line to attack Nanjing, and then ignorant and fearlessly extended the front line to Wuhan and Guangzhou...
In the end, the war became stronger and stronger, and Japan was in danger of riding the tiger. In order to completely blockade China and win the war, it did not hesitate to conquer Hong Kong and Hainan Island, invaded the Indochina Peninsula, Southeast Asia, and until it attacked Pearl Harbor.
The typical strategy of drinking poison to quench thirst with confusing thinking and no logic.
Looking now, Japan's strategic logic line is in chaos, which is due to Japan's domestic political atmosphere, military-political differences, and populist sentiment, and military-related major strategic differences between the Japanese Navy and the Army.
The July 7 Incident, the Navy interfered in the Army and proposed "The army's combat range will not exceed the Yongding River and Baoding line".
In the Songhu Incident, the Japanese Marine Corps and the Chinese Army broke out in direct conflict.
At this time, the Japanese Army and Navy began joint operations.
In this battle, the Japanese army and navy in the Beijing-Shanghai-Hangzhou War Zone adopted radical strategies, violated the combat plan formulated by the Japanese military headquarters, and bravely crossed the command line, captured Nanjing, and further escalated the Sino-Japanese War.
During the Battle of Wuhan, the Japanese army's winter clothing was not delivered in time, and Japanese soldiers were wearing summer clothing hid in straw to keep warm.
The Japanese children back then were all in spirit.
During the War of Invasion of China, the Japanese who joined the army were deported.
It is quite strange that just as the Sino-Japanese War was escalating into a full-scale war, the Japanese Navy used part of the 3rd Fleet to deal with the Chinese battlefield, while the Japanese Navy proposed to the Army Department that Chen Bing Zhang Gufeng and Nomenkan were prepared to fight against the Soviet Union.
On the contrary, the top leaders of the Japanese Army had no interest in the navy's northward strategy.
At that time, the comprehensive invasion of China with Japan's national strength and military strength was still in the quagmire of war. If the war with the Soviet Union was stirred up again in Manchuria and Mongolia, the consequences were simply unimaginable.
It can be seen that the so-called Chen Bing Zhang Gufeng and Nomenkan, who were preparing to fight against the Soviet Union, proposed that the so-called Chen Bing Zhang Gufeng and Nomenkan betrayed the Soviet Union was just a big fool by the Navy on the army.
The personal grievances and differences between the Japanese army and navy are diverse.
With Germany succeeded in the European war and the European and American powers cope with the European battlefield, Japan had fought for several years and lacked resources, so it took advantage of the situation to guide Southeast Asian colonies of the United States, Britain, France, the Netherlands and other countries, and seek a strategic direction of fighting to support the war.
At this point, in order to invade Southeast Asia, Japan had to attack Pearl Harbor, defeat the US Pacific Fleet, and eliminate the strategic threat to invade Southeast Asia.
On December 7, 1941, Japan successfully attacked Pearl Harbor.
At the same time, the countdown of the nuclear explosions in Hiroshima and Nagasaki has also turned on.
Looking back on history, it can be seen that Japan's national strength is not enough to support the continued full-scale war between China and Japan, and the gap in strength between the United States and Japan, sneak attack on Pearl Harbor is the most unrealistic strategic adventure in the history of war.
However, populist sentiment in Japan is surging, and Japanese decision-making and elite groups can only choose the only option to show off their strength and fight.
They knew in their hearts that if they did not do this, they would repeat the mistakes of the 226th Mutiny.
The 226th Mutiny was a landmark event that Japan completely abandoned some rational atmosphere that had been cultivated in the Taisho era, and stimulated the surge in populist sentiment of the whole people.
Looking back at the 226th Mutiny on February 26, 1936, many information now emphasizes the contradiction between the Imperial Doctrine and the commander-in-chief of the Japanese Army.
However, in terms of its institutional and political influence, this mutiny was a tacit interaction between the Japanese Emperor and the Japanese military and civilians in order to achieve centralized dictatorship.
It is noted that after the Meiji Restoration, Japan implemented a constitutional monarchy, but the emperor, named Xujun, was separated from power. As a political hermit, the emperor had a considerable influence on the Japanese cabinet.
However, the Japanese constitutional law order has always strictly limited the Japanese emperor's desire for power.
Facts have proved that in the 226th incident, then Prime Minister Keisuke Okada was almost killed, former Prime Minister and Japanese Minister of Interior Navy Mi was shot dead, education director Yutaro Watanabe was beheaded, former Prime Minister Takahashi was killed, and Japan's "constitutional monarchy" political ecology was extremely damaged.
Emperor Hirohito became the biggest beneficiary of this incident, and naturally completed centralization and dictatorship.
The Emperor completed his dictatorship, and the Japanese Cabinet, the Sea and the Army Department of Naturally fell into the Emperor's Shogunate in politics.
Hiki Tojo who attempted suicide after the Tokyo trial. To a large extent, Hideki Tojo deserves the crime, and at the same time, he is the scapegoat of Emperor Hirohito.
The Japanese Emperor and his family were actually the biggest culprits in the war of invasion of China.
Emperor Hirohito is very clear that ancient and modern politics, angry youth and populist sentiment are always natural allies of centralization and dictatorship.
In this regard, Japan launched a propaganda machine to cultivate angry youth and populist sentiment. A few years ago, the atmosphere of enlightenment in the Taisho period disappeared. Looking at Japan, angry youth emerged and populist, like this, watering manure crops and growing wildly.
The general trend is that the whole people are fanatical. Even if a few elites are clear-headed, at the critical moment, they can only keep their eyes closed and turn off the lights to sleep.
The Yamato nation lets itself go, rushing, and swelling...
After that, the Japanese cabinet and military and political decision-makers at all levels and of all levels became accustomed to the "shogunate" style, and changed their positions at any time to cater to the greatest extent possible.
As a result, the dictatorship of the Japanese emperor, the angry youth and populist sentiment strengthened each other, complementing each other, pushing Japan towards war and destruction.
Facts have proved that the 226 Mutiny and the Japanese political ecology have had a profound and significant impact on the Japanese war policy several years later.
In the end, Mine Mitsumasa was deeply shocked and changed his ruling style. In order to protect himself, he personally planned and directed the capture of Hainan Island, and promoted the Japanese army to launch a large-scale southward and adventure Southeast Asia.
The same is true for Yamamoto Izuku.
He is the Japanese Navy Commander who knows the strength of the United States and the consequences of Japan's war against the United States, and is also the last flag of the Japanese Navy conservatives.
However, he eventually became the mastermind and practitioner of the Japanese Navy's attack on Pearl Harbor.
The main force of the Japanese Joint Fleet, the USS Akagi aircraft carrier, was sunk by the US military on June 6, 1942.
The crew of the Japanese aircraft carrier Ruihe waved their hats on the deck and saw them off to sneak attack the second wave of dive bombers in Pearl Harbor.
The rapid transformation from goodwill to the United States to raid the United States was undoubtedly due to the huge potential fear of the Japanese emperor's reprimand and the flood of populist sentiment.
Speaking of this, it is not difficult to find:
In fact, in those days, from launching the war of aggression against China to sneak attacks on Pearl Harbor, and even two atomic bombs were hit, Japan had many years of war, and it seemed that there was no systematic and clear strategic thinking at all.
Military and war are themselves the most extreme forms of politics.
Because there is no systematic strategic idea at all, the reason why Japan launched a war of aggression against China and sneak attacks on Pearl Harbor does not exist because of military and war replacing politics and diplomacy. Naturally, there is no such thing as Japan's failure in diplomatic game with China, the Soviet Union, the United States and other countries turning to war.
This is an extremely complex history of entangled grudges.
However, the main line of this history is very rough and simple.
It is purely that the Japanese emperor completed centralization and dictatorship, reconstructed the Japanese political ecology, and allowed the top Japanese military and political leaders and elite groups, the Japanese populist sentiment and angry young people to stimulate and resonate with each other, forming a passionate political situation, and then emotionally and disorderly triggered the fuse of the Sino-Japanese War and the sneak attack on Pearl Harbor and other expanded wars.
Obviously, this is a war initiated by the Japanese emperor and populist sentiment.
From this perspective, the so-called "no wronged souls under the atomic bomb are not false statements.
I would like to use this article to commemorate the 80th anniversary of the victory of the Anti-Japanese War.
