With the continuous improvement of China's national strength and the United States and its allies resume their strategic layout of actively encircling and suppressing China, the tension in the Taiwan Strait has continued to escalate in recent years, becoming the most sensitive geopolitical hotspot in the Asia-Pacific region.
On the online media, we see from time to time that the United States and its allies send warships across the Taiwan Strait. This kind of military action with obvious provocative nature not only seriously undermines regional stability, but also poses a direct threat to China's sovereignty and security.
According to public reports, in the first half of 2024 alone, US warships had repeatedly trespassed into sensitive waters under the name of "freedom of navigation", and the naval forces of Japan, the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada and other countries also followed suit to join the ranks.
The collective strategic pressure behavior of the United States and Europe is essentially an international consensus that challenges the "one China" principle by creating fait accompli.
From a military perspective, these time travel actions are by no means simple harmless passages, but carefully designed political performances—every time travel is accompanied by high-profile media reports, deliberately creating a passive situation that China is forced to deal with.

The United States and the West provoked in the Taiwan Strait every few days
In fact, the wishful thinking of the senior executives in the United States and Europe is that this continuous provocation will cause double damage to China's international image, and can not only be packaged as news material that "China overreacts" and weaken China's actual control over the Taiwan Strait by repeatedly strengthening the existence of the US military and its allies.
More notable is that such actions are often implemented during major diplomatic activities or military exercises in China, and the timing choice is obviously carefully planned and has obvious strategic deterrence intentions.
For example, this time, on September 6, three days after the September 3 parade held in China, the Canadian Navy's "Quebec" frigate and the Australian destroyer "Brisbane" crossed the Taiwan Strait and nuised and provoked.
Such disgusting operations have also had an additional effect, that is, in Chinese public opinion, whether it is a "restraint" or a "hard" public opinion on whether the provocation of US and Western warships is "restrained" or "hard".
In the face of this systematic pressure, the Chinese Navy's response strategy is undergoing a profound change, from early restrained response to more proactive tactical countermeasures.

Sense of oppression from Fujian
The first practical voyage of the Fujian ship is typical evidence. The Fujian ship's choice of routes across the central Taiwan Strait is in sharp contrast to the previous practice of PLA warships sailing cautiously along the mainland coastline - this route choice itself is a substantial negation of the concept of "middle-line of the strait".
From a military geography perspective, the navigation route of the "Fujian" ship has been carefully designed: not only avoids the most sensitive Penghu waterway, but also maintains a tactical position that is enough to deter the opponent.
The berthing arrangement of its destination Sanya aircraft carrier base is more strategically meaningful: after forming a dual-carrier combat group configuration with the "Shandong" ships that are already stationed there, the Chinese Navy can achieve normalized control of the two strategic directions of the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea for the first time.
This deployment adjustment of the PLA Navy directly responds to the provocative model of the US military and its allies - when the other side tries to create multiple pressures by dispersing forces, China establishes regional denial capabilities by concentrating superior forces.
It is worth noting that the "Fujian" ship had already shown an unusual rhythm during the trial stage in the early stage of the navigation: the three-month silent period after the end of the eighth trial was a key node for the Chinese Navy to replace the special refueling ship.

The next time the 17th and 18th aircraft carriers will be launched
This transformation from civilian support to militarized support system implies that the ship has moved from the technical testing stage to combat readiness. Comparing the number of trial voyages before the service of the "Liaoning" ships and "Shandong" ships, it can be found that the test cycle of the "Fujian" ship was significantly shortened, reflecting China's rapid accumulation of aircraft carrier construction experience.
Compared with the two senior aircraft carriers, the leap in combat capability has made every future voyage of the "Fujian" ship a redefinition of the US military's "freedom of navigation" narrative: the PLA Navy is no longer a symbol of passive response, but a practical force to actively shape the regional security pattern.
In addition to the comparison of military strength, from a legal perspective, the issue of navigation rights in the Taiwan Strait is essentially a game between China and the United States on different interpretations of international maritime law.
According to Article 111 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea on the "right to pursue the law", when a country's warship pursues illegal ships, it can cross the so-called "middle line of the strait" until the target ship is intercepted - since 12 nautical miles of both sides of the Taiwan Strait are in China's territorial waters, there are no legal obstacles to this pursuit.
In other words, when the PLA exercises sovereign rights in the Taiwan Strait, they are completely unbounded by the imaginary midline unilaterally designated by Taiwan Province.

Illegal "middle line of the strait"
Although Taiwan Province now claims to have jurisdiction over 24 nautical miles of restricted waters based on Article 29 of the "Cross-Strait People's Relations Regulations", there is an obvious double standard for this administrative provision: only interception measures are implemented for mainland ships, but they are open to foreign warships.
This selective law enforcement is shameless, exposing its so-called political nature of "defense". It is not only unable to gain recognition from international law, but also fundamentally conflicts with the principle of "one China".
Recalling history, the territorial sea baseline coordinates (connection of 26°30' to 23°17' north latitude) announced by Taiwan Province in 1998 have never been recognized by the mainland. This unilateral demarcation is legally contradictory - not only denies the jurisdiction of the waters west of the central line, but also tries to impose jurisdiction over the waters east of the central line.
This legal vacuum state provides operational space for the intervention of extraterritorial forces. It is precisely because of this vague zone to implement strategic provocations in the name of "harmless passage".
The Chinese Navy's response strategy therefore includes a dual dimension: at the legal level, the jurisdictional claim over the overall waters of the Taiwan Strait will be continuously strengthened, and at the military level, the so-called "middle line" survival space is gradually compressed through normalized cruises.

The "Shandong" No. 1, anchored in Sanya
The choice of the "Fujian" ship's navigation route is a concrete manifestation of this three-dimensional countermeasure. It is not only a practical application of Article 111 of the Convention, but also a military declaration on the principle of "the two sides of the Taiwan Strait belong to one China".
Faced with the systematic combat capabilities demonstrated by the "Fujian" ship, the comparison of strength between China and the United States shows a complex situation of coexisting structural gaps and local advantages.
It is undeniable that the global deployment capabilities formed by the 11 nuclear-powered aircraft carriers in service in the U.S. Navy do maintain obvious advantages in gross tonnage, combat experience and ocean delivery.
This gap is not only reflected in the number of hardware, but also in the integrity of the aircraft carrier combat group - the number of cruisers and destroyers standard for each formation of the US military, as well as the practical experience of the carrier-based aircraft wing, have all been accumulated for a long time to form system advantages.
But the inclusion of the Fujian ship marks a breakthrough in the Chinese Navy's denial capability in specific areas: When the dual-carrier combat group is deployed in the Taiwan Strait-South China Sea area, it can form an effective deterrent to the intervention of the US Navy with the shore-based anti-ship missile and early warning aircraft network.

U.S. aircraft carrier formation
This regional anti-intervention capability makes the US military's traditional advantage in the Asia-Pacific region basically no longer exist. Although its global delivery capabilities are still dominant, it is difficult to maintain absolute control in local waters within the first island chain.
It is also worth noting that the development trajectory of the Chinese Navy shows a distinctive "asymmetric catch-up" feature: by focusing on the systematic construction of key sea areas, the ability to offset the US regional advantages in a short period of time.
The electromagnetic catapult system, new carrier-based aircraft and other equipment equipped by the Fujian ship still has room for improvement in the performance of a single ship, but the synergistic effect formed with the "Shandong" ship can achieve normalized control of disputed waters in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea.
This ability leap makes the "freedom of navigation" operations commonly used by the US military face higher risks. When the Chinese Navy has the ability to monitor the full process, respond quickly and strike systematically, the cost of political performances for single-ship traversal has increased significantly.
At present, the People's Navy has become the sixth naval force in the history of human civilization with a total tonnage of more than 2 million tons after Germany, Britain, the United States, Japan and the Soviet Union. As a large number of old ships of the US Navy have been retired one after another, new ships are in disguise. It is expected that by 2030, the comparison of the naval forces between the two countries will undergo subversive changes.

People's Navy's mighty
Just ask: We spent so much money and built so many ships, what do you think it is for? The answer is about to come out.