"The Left is a party of Murder."—Elon Musk
The huge and complex situation of group-oriented and organized interest groups created by the state capitalist process in the late 19th century cannot attract overall social loyalty. As clearly pointed out in the Communist Manifesto, this may be part of the bitter fruit of fate that the capitalist process itself must swallow. Although it is bitter, it comes from "necessity". Schumpeter commented on this general social atmosphere: "In the face of the increasing hostility around him and the legislative, administrative and judicial measures arising from that hostility, entrepreneurs and capitalists—in fact, the entire class that accepts the bourgeois lifestyle—will eventually cease to play. Their purpose is rapidly becoming unachievable, and their efforts are becoming futile. The most attractive bourgeois goal, the goal of establishing an industrial dynasty, has become a mirror in most countries; even smaller goals are extremely difficult to achieve, so that people are increasingly becoming the permanent nature of these conditions and no longer consider them worthy of struggle." But Schumpeter attributes the main reason for this general social criticism encountered by capitalism during this period to specific institutional reasons, which is essentially biased. He said: "The social atmosphere or value norms not only affects policy-legislative spirit-but also administrative measures. But there is a more direct relationship between intellectual groups and bureaucrats. The blood of European bureaucrats is pre-capitalist and non-capitalist. As centuries pass, no matter how much the composition of bureaucrats changes, they never completely equate themselves, their interests or their standards of value to the bourgeoisie, who simply regard the bourgeoisie as an asset managed by the interests of the monarch or the national interests." Schumpeter turned a blind eye to the "fighting facts" in the "Communist Manifesto" that are inherent in human society and historical processes, which prevented him from accepting the idea that the fate of capitalism being discriminated against is a movement of history itself.
Super, on the one hand, Schumpeter could only conduct the "pure science" analysis and extremely limited, superficial defense in "History of Economic Analysis" and "Business Cycle Theory", and on the other hand, she lamented purely dramaticly in "Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy": "When special capitalist interests and the bourgeoisie as a whole face direct attacks, they demonstrate this in a very distinctive way. They talked about protesting—or hired people to do these things for them; they did not miss every opportunity to compromise; they were always ready to give in; they never fought under their own ideals and interests—in the United States, there was nowhere to be found for the extremely heavy financial burden imposed over decades or labor legislation that was incompatible with effective corporate management. There is real resistance. At this moment, readers must have known that I absolutely do not overestimate the political power of large enterprises or the bourgeoisie in general. Moreover, I am ready to leave a huge room for their cowardice. However, the means of protection are not completely gone. History is full of examples of success in a few people, who are confident in their careers and stand majestic with guns. The only explanation of this tame attitude we see is that the bourgeois system no longer has any meaning in the bourgeoisie itself, which no longer really cares about its rise and fall, it just says everything, but does nothing. …After all, it is not as different as people think that capitalism declines because of its success or failure.
The field of collective spirit is the rise of the agnostic and direct "cultural view" of philosophy in order to match this distortion in the real field of society. As Bloom said in commenting on European cultural consciousness rooted in this period: "Now there is a completely new language for the interpretation of good and evil. The root of this language is the attempt to "super good and evil", which attempts to prevent us from judging good and evil." Bloom pointed out that the root of this phenomenon is to replace the traditional opposition between good and evil with central words such as agnostic and empiricist "value". Bloom further commented that this practice actually means the collapse of universal principles in Greek classical metaphysical thought, which creates It became a tragic worldview among the people and a cheap intellectual lifestyle among the ruling elite. In Bloom's words, this means that "all radical and subjective beliefs about good and evil have become comfortable self-protection and seeking easy-going servants." Bloom regards the European cultural concept rooted in this period as a devastating blow to the American spirit or the "American Dream". For this reason, Bloom calls for the return of Max Weber, Freud, Heidegger and others to Europe, and welcome rationalists such as Plato, Aristotle, Hobbes, and Locke. In any case, in Bloom's view, these figures who rose to the age of European "cultural concepts" represent the "mystery and suffering of Europeans with profound thoughts and sophistication", which is a desire for the hidden and primitive driving force of human existence. They strive to elevate this to the height of "culture" and fight against the "civilization" as a domestication force. All of this eventually gradually destroyed the rationalist tradition given to mankind by Greek philosophy, especially Adam Smith and Locke; therefore, Bloom puts the text of this period He described ideology as "mythology" and seriously asked people to abandon the mysterious words such as "obsession", "faith", "Chrisma" that are flooded on the market, such as sociology and philosophy agnosticism. The fact that he asked people to pay solemnly was that Homer was the pioneer of epic, the pioneer of platonic wisdom, Aristotle was the pioneer of science, and Protino was the pioneer of mystical thinking, and asked the American mind to return to the foundation of these ancient philosophy, and would not be able to reshape dignity without this. This is not unreasonable. Leo Strauss concluded: "Although a defeated country on the battlefield has been eliminated as a political form, it has seized the brilliant results of victory by putting its rope of thought on the conquerors. This is not the first time in history." Strauss strongly argued that the irreconcilable cultural and even mystical demands of the "fight of gods" represented by Max Weber, and ultimately transformed the real political struggle based on experience into an absolute conflict between culture and worldview, and thus fully exposed that pure "science" and "empirical" social science methods will establish a direct connection with irrational political demands without transit and medium; in this context, Strauss also strongly questioned the countries that had born the Declaration of Rights: Do they still adhere to their original beliefs and maintain their belief in the self-evident natural human rights? In Strauss's view, the answer may not lie in affirmation or negation. This is because once the field of political beliefs is occupied by various irrational cultural politics or worldview politics, Weber's logic is finally established, which means that the essence of the political field lies in eternal, unregulated and eternal struggles of the gods, rather than in the philosophical analysis of a certain universal value. Then at this point, whether to believe in natural human rights is no longer important. In fact, the final result of Weber's methodological logic in social sciences is on the road of the same end of the same end with Treichk's historical logic, because Treichk pointed out that once political conflict rises to the field of cultural struggle, there will be no possibility of adjustment and compromise. Therefore, Wenderban concluded: "Based on this, if 'absolute liberation' is impossible, there is a relative liberation: the purely unwilling cognitive subject is very active in the quiet observation without regard to interests and the thinking without regard to interests; in such a rational state, there is relative liberation of distress. The objects of both quiet observation without regard to interests and the thinking without regard to interests do not exist in individual phenomena but in the eternal form (idea) of objectification of will. However, this platonic factor must be suitable for Schopenhauer's metaphysical system It is extremely difficult; according to Schopenhauer's metaphysical system, the concretization of the entire will is considered to be just an idea in time and space; but this factor gives the philosopher an opportunity to apply Schiller's principle of observing seclusion in the most favorable way to complete his conception of life. When the will can aimlessly manifest, intuitively and think about its objectification, it is freed from itself. The suffering of the irrational world will is relieved by morality and overcome in art and science. " Winderban's so-called "surpassed in science and art" has a clear meaning, referring to the absolute dual separation of art and science. This separation also constitutes the basic background of the methodology of separation of "value" and "facts". This separation, both logically and in fact, led to the "worldview demand" that prevailed in Europe during this period and the despair of human rationality; the most outstanding minds of this era fell into the methodological sequence of the separation of "value" and "factual", and it was very difficult to resist this, and even all of this seemed to appear natural because it was inevitable. Weber is a special and complex character in this methodological debate. No one can make more severe criticism and ridicule of the cheap "worldview needs" and "cultural needs" in this period. At the end of Weber's public speech "Politics as a career", Weber asked those who hold "worldview needs" to leave politics, and pointed out in the preface to "German Parliament and Government under the New Order": "There is no doubt that the innocence of most relevant literati is the most shameful side of their excessive behavior. ... It is said that now is not the time to deal with domestic political issues, because There are other things to do for us. …If ‘we’ (referring to those who stayed in the country during the war) declares as repeatedly, ‘If you (referring to soldiers) fail to achieve the war goals we envision, your blood will be in vain’, in order to harm the soldiers’ sense of joy for their own achievements, then in my opinion, this will not only fundamentally damage morale, but also completely intolerable from the perspective of pure humanity. … But literati and poets are busy creating various concepts ’, in their opinion, the bloodshed and sacrificed for these ideas by the soldiers on the front line. ”Politics is a work of "passing hard and slowly through hardwood boards", so it requires "a strong heart so that he can withstand the destruction of all his hopes... A man must be convinced that even if the world seems foolish to him and is not worthy of dedication to him, he can still be without regrets; despite the situation in which he faces such a situation, he can still say: ‘Wait and see! ’—Only when it reaches this point, he can say that he has heard of politics Call." However, this speech also made the insurmountable two-dimensional structure in Weber's methodology present an extremely contradictory situation; on the one hand, it was a foolish social fact, which in Weber's view was a rigid object in the complete sense, and on the other hand, it was a talented or charming political leader as the main character of the speech, that is, the subject of political action. The fundamental characteristic of this character is that he can transcend and confront the rigid social facts by obeying the inner "summoning". It is this two-member confrontation structure that has been advanced to extremes by Weber, which explains the despair and rushing mentality shown by Weber at the beginning of his speech: "This speech I gave at your invitation will inevitably disappoint you in some aspects. You will definitely look forward to me to talk about politics as a profession to make a stand on some of the contemporary realities. But only at the end of the speech, to answering the special issues involved in the meaning of political action in our entire life, will I make some purely formal statements. At the same time, people should engage inWhat kind ofPolitics, that is, what should be given to one's political activities?Content , these issues must be excluded from today's speech. Because these issues have no connection with the general question of the meaning of politics as a career and what it can have. " (quoted from, Weber: "Politics is the career", see "Selected Political Works", ep. 296 and 274; the focus is added in the original text) Obviously, Weber's so-called political leaders are religious figures similar to religious reformers or prophets, and thus completely different from Hegel's "world historical individuals". However, all this was unfortunately hit by Weber. The excessive evaluation of the achievements of "cultural" and the demand for "worldview" led to people either directly intervening in politics in a cheap "worldview" or some "cultural politics" form, making political life appear as an extreme combination of utopia and power struggle or mob politics, or it leads to "a cold attitude towards politics". This is a common European phenomenon, and its role in Germany is particularly typical. Culture is a substitute for politics. This is a general idea that runs through Germany's late 19th century history, and ultimately leads to the Germans scoffing at politics - this attitude away from parliamentary politics in the name of culture is the ideological root that directly leads to the failure of the Weimar Republic; Elias pointed out in "The Germans": "The meaning embedded in the German word "culture" is right and wrong. Political, and perhaps even anti-political prejudice, which is a symptom that recurs in the German middle-class elite, that is, politics and state affairs represent the field of shame and lack of freedom, while culture represents their free state, and their dignity and pride. In some periods of the 18th and 19th centuries, anti-political prejudice in the concept of middle-class ‘culture’ pointed the finger at the dictatorship of princes and nobles… In the subsequent periods, this anti-political prejudice turned to the parliamentary politics of democratic countries. "Spengler even shamelessly attributed the reasons for the Nazis coming to power in 1933 to the "lower" and "poverty" of the Germans during this period, pointing out that the Nazis were just trying to establish a dream empire, and the inner state of poets and thinkers was facing the danger of becoming a territorial plague of slanderers and empty talkers under this situation. It is obvious that Spengler understood the success of the Nazis from the perspective of "inner kingdom", and he did not mention a single word about the political-economic reasons why the Weimar Republic became the prey of the Nazis. In short, by no longer believing that there is an eternal foundation that ensures the identity and cognizability of the subject and the object, one can only escape from various arbitrary and cheap "worldviews". Schumpeter is very clear about this: "I have no disrespect for these outstanding figures. They are the highest authority in the field of extensive knowledge, but their minds have been formed into shape by the work and training of philosophers, historians and linguists. Therefore, when they set the laws for us with enviable confidence, they draw a completely unrealistic dividing line between the 'laws of nature' and the 'laws of cultural development', or between the 'statements of laws' and the 'narratives of history'. They forget that most of the social sciences cross this line, The facts seriously undermined the use of this line. They were nothing but laymen in the problems of these parts of the social sciences and their epistemological nature, but failed to impose appropriate restrictions in their arguments. This easily led many economists who believed their words, such as Max Weber, to the path of being deeply influenced by Lee Celtic: it was both regrettable and inevitable. Let us pay attention to a compelling statement by Dilthey, which reads like a creed in Max Weber's methodology: 'WeExplanationEnlightenmentEnlightenmentSoul (or cultural phenomenon)'." From this, it is not difficult to understand why Thomas Mann regarded art as the real field that reflects human nature like religion, and politics "escapes without a trace in front of art, like fog encounters sunshine." This purely self-sufficient cultural form also contributes to a certain direct sense of self-justice. In a later speech, Thomas Mann declared: "Goethe believes that the German people are a nation far away from politics and intelligent. They focus on human values, draw nourishment from all, and educate everyone. Even in a period of intense transition to make up for mistakes and national self-revision, will these Germans not have a deep sense of justice?" Looking back at the era of classicism and idealism in German history, it is just an expression of the general cultural nostalgia in Europe during this period. The direct result of this cultural self-sufficiency mentality and noble sense of self-righteousness is to promote a distance from politics and maintain an ironic or cynical attitude towards the human experience world, that is, the political-historical world, but this is only superficial; on the other hand, this cultural mentality also cultivates various irrational "world-view politics", a "world based on cultural concepts, rather than experience existence. The worldview" thus directly breaks into the political field, uses culture and art as political compensation fantasy, and turns a blind eye to the fundamental difference between aesthetic care or amoral care in the field of culture and art and moral care in the field of politics; in other words, political helplessness and incompetence have led to the invasion of a priori and even transcendental cultural and artistic concepts, regardless of what kind of "rational" principle is based on the invasion to ridicule and despise the "democratic use" of culture and art. In the shadow of "cultural nostalgia", for Marx, the Paris Commune appeared as a model, and its function may not lie in its actual effectiveness or its success in the sense of empiricism and real politics. As the "flag", its significance lies in its breaking through the floodgates of the "universal suffrage" system and parliamentary system that were manipulated by France, just as the English Charter Movement that took place not long ago once broke through the floodgates of constitutionalism. As the most profound observer of the Second Empire, Marx witnessed with his own eyes how the emperor himself went from a potential revolutionary Mazinney to a ruler who advocated economic austerity, peace and minor reforms, and how he became an anti-democratic ruler, and together with Bismarck, a diplomatic designer of the counter-revolutionary forces throughout Europe. This change did not only happen to one person, the change of the emperor himself was just a microcosm and replica of a class. Almost all the nobles, army and industrial and commercial classes of the Second Empire had seen hope in Bonaparte for economic rationalization and prudent political reforms, and were secretly delighted by this. People have been trying to underestimate the profoundness and intensity of the lower-class democracy in France during the Second Empire, and thus despise the fear and counter-revolutionary psychology of the French bourgeoisie or proletarians during this period. In his "Memoirs of 1848", Tocqueville successfully confused this psychology with the sorrowful mentality of a declining aristocrat. Just as Cicero in the late Roman Republic lamented the loss of the republic with a calm attitude of dying, the "social fear" mentality brought about by property-based guilt and insecurity is missing in Tocqueville's contemporary historical picture. Therefore, it is no surprise that Tocqueville also complained about the "people's indifference" in the same memoir. This is because although there were a large number of electoral uproars, riot revolutions at the subpolitical level, and traditional barricade wars in French politics during this period, he looked at the problem from an ideal classical politics or Montesquieu-like aristocratic system. He did not feel that the overwhelming majority of radical candidates would help increase the political participation of the "citizens", in which he actually held the same idea as the middle-class utilitarians in England, assuming that the popularity of property and suffrage endangered "freedom", they would rather give up the former and choose the latter. Whether for Mueller or Tocqueville, they knew that they didn't have to take the mob at all; representative governments, whether they were mono-campus or bi-campus, should be like a closed and strict community similar to Protestantism. In England and France, this society is composed of land interest groups and industrial and commercial interest groups, and only these groups have the right to represent. The key to rule is to avoid the division within the elite group similar to that of the Stuart dynasty in England or the old French system. For them, such divisions are really artificial tragedy, based on stupidity and short-sightedness, rather than appendix to the natural evolutionary process of society. During this period, whether in England or France, the social facts were destined that representative system could only satisfy administrative institutions and management politics, but could not satisfy parliamentary politics itself. The ideal form of parliamentary politics was only vaguely explained in Mueller's "Representative Government". This is even more serious in France. The sale of public land and church land during the Great Revolution and the later introduction of the Napoleon Code created a more capitalist environment for the nobles and capitalists; although the Great Revolution added legal and political liberalism, under the careful management of the regime, the ultimate result of French economic modernization only defended state capitalism and bureaucratic politics. As Napoleon observed thoroughly in his letter to his brother, the founding king of Bavaria in 1808: "In Germany, as in France, Italy and Spain, people longed for peace and freedom. The benefits of the Napoleon Code, the open court proceedings, and the jury will make your monarchy very outstanding." No one is better than Napoleon's ability to observe human feelings and dominate the spiritual essence of the "long 19th century" to replace political citizenship with social citizenship. It is this dark background that contrasts why various "concepts" or "culture" gush out, but it is not difficult to see that behind all the "cultural nostalgia" is the irrational appeal for individual redemption; irrational appeals that are also essentially individual have also become the prerequisite for the worldview of experience or "empirical" scientific research during this period; this is clearly presented from Mengsen and Weber. Whether it is Mengsen's enthusiastic Caesarist appeal or the hidden and deeply sympathy shown by Weber for the Chrisma type politicians, they are the real motivations buried as support behind their pure empirical and scientific research. Woglin commented on Weber's irrational and personal redemptional ethical attitude in a way of recalling autobiographical nature, and pointed out that this ethical attitude is rooted in Weber's "scientific" methodology adhered to by the Institute of Social Sciences: "The problem of throwing away an ideology because it is scientifically untenable in the past few years. What is very important in the formation of my scientific attitude is my early familiarity with Weber's work. His Sociology of Religion and Economics and Society were also published in those years, and we students certainly read them greedily. Weber's lasting influence can be discussed in the following points. First, Weber's paper on Marxism as early as 1904-1905 completed my rejection of Marxism, that is, it is scientifically untenable, and this rejection has been prepared in the course of economics and economic theory history, which I have mentioned earlier. Second, Weber's later lecture on academics and politics clarified that various ideologies are so-called "values", which are what a person has to assume when acting, but they are not scientific propositions in themselves. This problem is due to Weber's distinction between the ethics of intention (Gesinnungsethik) and the ethics of responsibility (English translation as ethics The ethics of intention and ethics of responsibility is sharpened. Weber is on the ethics of responsibility—that is, the ethics of taking responsibility for the consequences of a person’s actions, so that, for example, a person establishes a government that confiscates the property of the owner, he must be responsible for the misery of the deprived people he has caused. In the morality or nobility of a person’s intentions, the reason for responsibility for the sinful consequences of moralist actions cannot be found at all. The purpose of moralism does not justify the immorality of action. Weber's fundamental insight has a solid influence even if he does not fully analyze its meaning. All kinds of ideologies are not science, and all kinds of ideals are not substitutes for ethics at all. As I later discovered, Weber's distinction is closely linked to the neo-Kantian methodology of historical science, developed by Likert and Vendelban of southwestern Germany. What becomes clear in Weber's context is that social science, if it wants to be a science, must be value-neutral. For Weber, that means sociologists have to explore causality in social processes. The values he used to choose these materials were prerequisite and were not scientifically processed; value judgments were therefore forced to be expelled from science. This left him with difficulties, namely, the premise of material selection used in scientific and a responsibility ethics, that he had to stay in the shadow. Weber cannot analyze these areas. In his theory, the external symptoms of this gap lie in the fact that in his religious sociology, although it is wide, it does not deal with early Christianity or classical philosophy at all. That is to say, the empirical analysis of providing guidelines for order of survival and responsible action is still outside his scope of consideration. If Weber never degenerated into some kind of relativism or anarchism, it is also because, even without such analysis, he was a man of a firm ethical character and, in fact, a mystic (as disclosed in the biography of his nephew Aiduad Baumgaton). Therefore, he knows what is right without knowing the reason for it. Of course, in terms of science, it is a very dangerous position, because students want to know the reasons why they should act in a definite way; and once the reason—that is, the rational order of survival—is excluded from consideration, emotions can easily lead you into various ideological and idealistic adventures, in which the purpose becomes more exciting than the means. ” A man is not waiting for science to explain his life to him. When theorists explore social reality, they will find that the field is already filled with self-or imposed explanations that can be called social facts. Human society is not just a fact or an event in the external world, which can be studied by observers like studying natural phenomena. Society demonstrates itself through "culture" and is a necessary component of social reality, and is often shaped into essential components. It is through "culture" that social members experience that society is far more than an accident or convenience, but carries their human nature. The Romantic movement resolutely fought back against the Enlightenment concept. Rousseau, Held, Schelling and others believe that rationality and emotion cannot be separated, and that individuals cannot get rid of the influence of their "culture". They deny that people should act rationally, deny universal values beyond history and regions, and also deny that peace and prosperity are goals worth pursuing. In their view, people are nothing more than an organic whole, such as culture, nation, country, religion, a certain "absolute spirit" or a certain "historical force". People should maintain spiritual harmony with the great whole to which they belong. The greatest good in the world is a heroic struggle, not a solution to human problems. Violence is inherent in nature. Suppressing violence is also equivalent to killing the vitality of life. Therefore, "culture" ultimately and inevitably leads to Baudelaire's conclusion: "There are only three noble people in the world: pastors, warriors and poets. Their functions are to understand, kill and create." So, to what extent a person is sober and upright can only depend on how much he can stay away from "culture".
