«——【·Foreword·】——»
At around 3:00 p.m. local time on September 9, the Israeli Air Force launched a large-scale air strike on Doha, the capital of Qatar, in an attempt to assassinate Khalid Mashar, chairman of the Overseas Politburo of Hamas. Khalil Haya, vice chairman and head of the Doha negotiating delegation, made new progress.
«——【·The fatal break of the intelligence chain·】——»
At around 3 pm on September 9, the tranquility of the Qatar capital Doha was broken by the continuous explosion. The Israeli Air Force originally planned to implement a "precise removal" of Hamas' overseas leadership, but eventually deviated from all preset scripts due to an unexpected detail of religious customs.
More than 10 missiles hit the target building accurately, but they allowed core figures such as Hamas Overseas Politburo Chairman Khalid Mashar and Vice Chairman Khalil Haya to escape from danger. This military operation that raided 1,900 kilometers not only left behind the devastated building wreckage, but also exposed many fatal loopholes in modern intelligence warfare and air defense systems.
In the intelligence analysis room of the Israeli national security department "Simbet", the coordinates on the screen once convinced analysts that the target had been locked. After the Hamas leader entered a building in Doha, the electronic equipment signals he carried were continuously stable in the conference room area, which was exactly in line with the data sent back by the pre-penetrating micro monitor.
Information personnel determined based on this that a perfect "decapitation operation" was about to be realized. What they didn't know was that at this time there were only a few lost mobile phones left in the conference room, and their owners had moved to the prayer room for the free gifts of five weeks a day.
This fatal negligence on religious customs caused the Israeli carefully to collapse in an instant. The rules of worship time followed by Hamas leaders should be the basic element that long-term monitoring must be taken into consideration.
Compare the successful assassination of Israel in Iran in June this year. At that time, Mossad accurately locked the whereabouts of Iranian nuclear scientists by tracking the mobile phone signals of the target bodyguard. In this action, Simbet obviously continued the inertial thinking that relies on electronic signal tracking, but ignored the decisive impact of religious activities on daily itineraries in Arab society.
When the missile roared down, the signal on the surveillance screen was still stable, and intelligence personnel could even see faint signals occasionally on the phone screen - that was a prompt to receive text messages, but was misjudged as a proof that the target was still active.
What is more interesting is the single risk of intelligence sources. Sources quoted by Reuters revealed that the intelligence verification of the operation only relies on two means: electronic signals and fixed surveillance, and did not use human intelligence for final confirmation. This technology dependence is common in modern anti-terrorism operations, but it leads to big mistakes at critical moments.
The successful experience of Israeli intelligence agencies in Iran shows that only a multi-dimensional intelligence system that combines electronic surveillance, human infiltration and cultural habit analysis can deal with security protection for high-value goals. In this operation, the indifference to religious etiquette became the most fragile link in the entire intelligence chain.
«——【·The tactical mystery of the Thousand Miles Raid·】——»
As the indicator lights of the Israeli Air Force Base flashed in the night, 15 fighter jets had completed their preparations for missile launch. They will carry out one of the farthest air strike missions in the history of the IDF—Doha decapitation operation with a straight line of more than 1,700 kilometers.
Such a long journey is itself an ultimate test of tactical planning. The route map restored by the US "power" website "War Zone" channel afterwards showed that Israeli fighter jets did not choose a straight route to cross Saudi airspace, but followed the classic routes when they attacked Iran: they took advantage of Syria and Iraqi airspace, headed south along the edge of the Persian Gulf, and finally launched ammunition from near the Kuwait border.
This detour route has increased the range of nearly 500 kilometers, but has successfully avoided Saudi Arabia's perfect air defense network. The Syrian Julani government has long been accustomed to the transit of Israeli fighter jets, and the war-torn country's air defense system has become useless in years of conflict.
The Iraqi government also adopted acquiescent attitude, and its F-16 fighter jets were not launched into the air to intercept them throughout the entire journey, and watched the Israeli military aircraft fleet cross airspace. Behind this "selective blindness" is the helpless compromise of Middle Eastern countries under Israel's military deterrence, which also reflects the serious imbalance in regional security order.
After the fighter fleet completed its last air refueling over the Persian Gulf, it began to release the weapons loads it carried. The list of ammunition disclosed by the BBC shows that the Israeli army used a hybrid configuration of gliding guided bombs and the "Delilla" cruise missile.
The former is sufficient to carry out precise strikes outside the Qatar air defense circle with a range of more than 100 kilometers and hit accuracy of less than 3 meters; the latter uses satellite/inertia composite guidance and combined with the last-stage infrared imaging system to lock targets in complex electromagnetic environments. This weapon combination not only ensures the accuracy of the strike, but also minimizes the risk of exposure of fighter jets, reflecting the integration capabilities of Israel's military-industrial system. However, the superior weapon performance ultimately failed to make up for the fundamental errors in intelligence judgment.
«——【·Collective Silence of Prevention and Control Network·】——»
On the radar screen of Udeid Air Force Base in Qatar, an abnormal signal flashed briefly and disappeared without a trace. This US military base, only 30 kilometers away from Doha, is deployed with SPY-1D phased array radar that is claimed to be able to detect targets 400 kilometers away, as well as multiple "Patriot-3" air defense and anti-missile systems.
Theoretically, any aerial target will find it difficult to escape this three-dimensional monitoring network, but the Israeli fighter fleet and the more than 10 ammunition fired are like entering a no-man's land. This huge contrast between practical performance and paper performance has made the multi-billion-dollar air defense system an international laughing stock.
The practical shortcomings of the "Patriot" system have long been precedent. During the Gulf War in 1991, the US military claimed that the system's interception efficiency was as high as 97%, but the post-study survey showed that the actual interception rate was less than 9%. The crosstalk effect of radar system and the lack of adaptability of software algorithms have led to a large number of "Scud" missiles breaking through to defense.
Although the Patriot-3, which is now deployed in Qatar, has been improved for many generations, its performance on the Ukrainian battlefield proves that its combat effectiveness is still greatly reduced when facing low-altitude penetration targets and electronic interference. Israel has clearly understood the weaknesses of the system and chose to launch a raid in a complex electromagnetic environment, which has put the radar operators of the Qatar air defense forces in a dilemma of target identification.
What is more worthy of attention is the coordination of the air defense system. In addition to the Patriots, Qatar is also equipped with NASAMS medium-range air defense system and has signed an agreement to introduce the THAAD anti-missile system. These systems that are divided into different combat levels should constitute hierarchical defense, but they fight on their own in actual operations.
«——【·Conclusion·】——»
Washington's reaction is more intriguing. The U.S. military bases responded slowly to the air strikes that were within reach, which triggered speculation from the outside world about the tacit understanding of the United States and Israel. Although a White House spokesman condemned Israel's "uncoordinated military action", no substantive sanctions were taken.
This vague attitude reflects the United States' strategic dilemma in the Middle East: it wants to maintain regional stability but is unwilling to restrain Israel's security actions. Israel seems to have figured out this psychology and used this action to test the United States' strategic bottom line and accumulate experience for similar actions against Iran in the future. As the missile wreckage was cleared on the streets of Doha, the geopolitical problems left by this unsuccessful assassination have just begun to ferment.
